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CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE
IN THE LAW OF LABOUR RELATIONS
H. W. ARTHTflRSt
Challenge and response in the law are by no means confined
to the area of labour relations. In many areas of law, which
touch upon controversial social questions, there is a continual
and a healthy tension between law and life. Law, after all, is a
technique for preserving order and stability in society, for substituting calm and reasoned judgment for passion and violent
pursuit of self interest. Necessarily, however, the order and
stability which law represents take the form of a prevailing
social consensus. Thus, before the law can change, it is necessary
for society's thinking to change. Inevitably, then, there is a
cultural lag between legal and social values. This lag is accentuated by our few, slow, and clumsy techniques for law reform.
As someone has put it, the problem is that judges won't and
legislators can't.
The common law, at best, is laboriously built, case upon case,
over a period of years. Thus, it is extremely unlikely that the
development of a common law doctrine will be much altered
once its foundations are laid. Such shifts as do take place are
likely to be marginal, and often surreptitious. Moreover, the
common law judge can only speak when a litigant brings a case
to him. Thus, even if the courts were receptive to change, it
might be years before the appropriate occasion arose, especially
since the facts of a particular case are crucial in determining its
outcome. The common law, in sum, is likely to respond to social
challenges with something less than haste. Even this truism
ignores the propriety or otherwise of judges deciding fundamental, yet delicate, issues of public policy.
More and more, then, we have turned to the legislatures to
solve labour problems. Yet, here again, the law does not automatically change its course to adapt to new challenges. Typically,
labour relations legislation is the product of vigorous and belligerent lobbying by each side for a new law with which to club
the other into submission. Even if the law is less extreme than
t H. W. Arthurs, B.A., LL. B. (Toronto); LL.M. (Harvard), Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. This artide is an adaptation of an
address delivered to the Founding Conference of the University of Toronto
Centre for Industrial Relations, October 14, 1965.
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its sponsors might have wished, it is unlikely that the loser
in this legislative donnybrook will accept the new law in good
grace, and will make it work well. It must be emphasized, moreover, that the relationship between life and law, between social
challenge and legal response, is one of reciprocity. Just as the
law changes slowly to produce new solutions for the industrial
relations community, so too the law's impact upon that community produces new problems which in turn demand their
own solution.
Yet, the great challenges are external to the law and are
produced by the dynamics of industrial relations. Set against
the background of a rather rigid and unresponsive legal system,
these seem swifter and more urgent. Consider some of the recent
developments in the world of industrial relations, and the challenges they must pose to the legal system. Trite indeed it is to
observe that our world is ever more rapidly changing in its
technology, in its complexity and interdependence. What is less
frequently observed is a rapid and profound revolution of our
expectations. In international relations, it is no doubt the very
magnitude of potential conflict which has produced an earnest
(and occasionally successful) search for new techniques of
peacekeeping. Not all of these techniques seek to end conflict
as it erupts. The vast proliferation of international agencies of
aid and collaboration is intended to strike at the very roots of
discontent. By assisting the "have-not" countries, the "haves"
hope to preserve the peace, while gaining good-will. A less
cynical interpretation of events might be that we are finally
recognizing our international moral responsibilities. But whether
their motives are selfish or noble, we have come to expect more
of nations. So, too, with the world of industrial relations. In
an increasingly complex economy, caught up in a process of
technological change, we are in the midst of a revolution of
expectations. Yesterday we were prepared to contemplate strikes
as an inevitable adjunct of collective bargaining. Tomorrow, we
may no longer let the parties make war. Indeed, even today we
are no longer content that industrial strife should be speedily
ended. We have begun to anticipate strife, and to eradicate its
causes.' Perhaps, indeed, we have begun to introduce a new
1 "Continuous bargaining" experiments have begun in the steel industry, and
others, in the United States. In Canada, annual high-level labour-management
conferences in the Domtar companies, and the work of the Nova Scotia Insti-
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element of morality into our judgment of how labour and management should behave.
Is our law attuned to these new developments? The answer
seems to be negative. Technology changes quickly, yet the
parties often freeze their relationships in a collective agreement
binding for two or three years - and cannot legally sign an
agreement for less than one.2 Our problems are constantly more
complex, yet our-legislative policy is designed to encourage collective bargaining only on the basic issues of wages and working
conditions.3 Our social and economic units are increasingly interdependent, yet our constitution fragments nation-wide bargaining into provincial patterns,4 and our statutes put a premium
on the single-union, single-employer bargaining unit.5 And finally,
our law of labour relations embodies the low expectations, the
old morality, of the nineteen thirties and forties. No more is
demanded than a minimal and murky statutory duty to "bargain in good faith"" and adherence to a judicially-drafted set
of Marquis of Queensbury rules for industrial warfare. While
7
an elaborate jurisprudence has developed around the latter,

stute of Public Affairs are two prominent examples of the "new wave" in
industrial peacekeeping. See The Status of Labour-Management Cooperation
in Canada, 65 LAB. GAZ. 226 (1965).
2
See, e.g., Labour Relations Act, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 202 (1960), § 39(1);
B.C. REV. STAT. c. 205 (1960), § 23(1).
3
See, e.g., Labour Relations Act, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 202 (1960), § 1(c);
B.C. REV. STAT. c. 205 (1960), § 2(1); Industrial Relations and Disputes
Investigation Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 152 (1952), § 2(1) (d).
4 Scott, Federal Jurisdiction Over Labour Relations - A New Look, 6 McGILL
L. J. 153 (1960).
5
See, e.g., Pigott Construction, (1965) C.C.H.L.L.R. P. 16,053 (O.L.R.B.).
In Ontario, a union may only be certified for a single-employer bargaining
unit (Labour Relations Act, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 202 (1960), §§ 1(1) (a);
5(1) ), although by a process of voluntary recognition, it may bargain and
sign an agreement with an employer association (§ § 1 (1) (c); 38). In British
Columbia (Labour Relations Act, B.C. REv. STAT. c. 205 (1960), § (10(4)),
and elsewhere, although a union may be certified for a multi-employer bargaining unit, the consent of each employer affected is required for inclusion
in the unit Moreover, for purposes of a strike vote, the unit is fragmented
into a number of single-employer constituencies, in each of which a majority
vote is a necessary prerequisite of a legal strike. See Association of Electrical
Contractors v. I.B.E.W. (1963) 40 D.L.R.2d 907 (Alta. S.C.); Pacific Western Planing Mills v. I.W.A., [1955] 1 D.L.R. 652 (B.C.S.C.).
6 See, e.g., Labour Relations Act, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 202 (1960), § 12; B.C.
REV. STAT. c. 205 (1960), § 18. This duty, of course, embraces conciliation.
7 See Inter alia, Arthurs, Tort Liability for Strikes in Canada: Some Problems
of Judicial Workmanship, 38 CAN. B. REV. 346 (1960); Carrothers, Recent
Developments in the Tort Law of Picketing, 35 CAN. B. REV. 1005 (1957).
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the former remains virtually unexplored: almost anything satisfies the duty.8
The challenge for men of law, as even this brief survey indicates, is to avoid the collision of irresistible social forces and
immoveable legal objects.
Consider, first the law as an immoveable object, rigid in both
procedure and substance. Two basic, but often clashing, values
in the law are speed and fairness. Of course, in industrial relations, time is always of the essence. A union awaiting certification may see its support ebb away over a period of weeks or
months; an employer threatened with picket line pressure may
lose thousands of dollars in a single day; the relative bargaining
strength of the parties may be greatly altered if negotiations
are protracted into or beyond peak production periods. Yet,
there is always the danger that in attempting to move with the
rapid pace of events, legal procedures may be less than fair.
Three quite different examples come to mind.
Crucial to understanding the current controversy over the
use of the labour injunction, is realization of the fact that it
involves these legitimate but competing values - speed and
fairness. The employer's interest is in speed: for him time is
money. The union, accused of wrongdoing, takes its stand on
the issue of fairness: for it, time is the opportunity to prepare
and present a defence. To some extent, the unions' position was
vindicated, when British Columbia and Ontario both virtually
abolished the ex parte injunction, in 1959 and 1960, respectively. 10
The legislatures apparently decided that confrontation of one's
accuser, a basic principle of our legal procedure, was more
deserving of protection than speedy protection of an employer's
8

R. ex. rel. Hearn v. Norfolk General Hospital, (1958) 119 Can. Crim. Cas.
Ann. 290 (Ont. Mag. Ct.); New Method Laundry and Dry Cleaners, (1957)
C.C.H.L.L.R. P. 16,059 (O.L.R.B.); Trenton Memorial Hospital, 64 C.L.L.C.
P. 16,302 (O.L.R.B.).
9 A number of unions submitted briefs to the Royal Commission on Civil Rights
in Ontario (Hon J. C. McRuer, Commissioner) attacking the use of the
labour injunction. For example, the SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED AUTOMOBILE
WORKERS at 1, suggests that "the labour injunction encroaches unjustifiably
upon two of our most basic civil liberties - freedom of speech and due process of law." See generally CARROTHERS, THE LABOUR INJUNCTION IN BRITISH
COLUMBIA (1956); SEIDENBERG, THE LABOUR INJUNCTION IN
10

NEw YORK

CITY, 1935-1950 (1953); Aaron, Labor Injunctions in the State Courts, 50
VA. L. REV. 951, 1147 (1964).
Trade Unions Act, B.C. REV. STAT. c. 384 (1960), § 6; Judicature Act, ONT.
REV. STAT. c. 197 (1960), § 17.
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economic interests. This statement is, however, subject to important qualifications, at least in Ontario. First, violence, destruction of property and disruption of a public service are all
enjoinable without notice. 1 These are, no doubt, reasonable exceptions. Second, only in "labour disputes" is the use of the
ex parte injunction restricted. 12 By a process of judicial interpretation, the term "labour dispute" has been confined to situations where there is a proximate employer-employee relationship. 13 Thus, secondary picketing, organizational and recognition picketing, and other common union tactics, lie beyond the
protection of a full hearing. Third, even in cases where notice
is given to the offending union, it is frequently a practical
impossibility for the union to avail itself of its theoretical privilege to file affidavit material, and to cross-examine the employer's
witnesses. 14 Thus, the injunction may be decided on the basis
solely of material filed by the plaintiff employer. Fourth, injunction matters are heard in weekly court, where often a list of
thirty or forty cases threatens to engulf the most dedicated
judge; the time available for a full canvass of the relevant facts
and law may be severely limited. Finally, restrictions upon the
right to appeal from interlocutory injunction orders means that
the jurisprudence developed by the trial courts has never been
thoroughly rationalized by appellate review, at least in Ontario.'15
All of these facts give to labour injunction proceedings an air
of unseemly haste. Yet the challenge is clear: if there is wrongful picketing being conducted, with severe financial losses being
inflicted upon the employer, is he not entitled to speedy relief?
Other jurisdictions have grappled with this problem, and have
not always resolved it satisfactorily. In England, for example,
judicial regulation of industrial disputes was all but ended by
the Trade Disputes Act of 1906,16 which immunized unions from
"1Judicature Act, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 197 (1960), § 17(3).
12Judicature Act, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 197 (1960), §§ 16, 17.
13Cf. Poole Construction v. Horst, (1964) 47 D.L.R.2d 455 (Sask. C.A.).
There are no reported Ontario decisions on this point.

14 Rules of Practice, ONT. REV. REG. 1960, Reg. 396, § 228 (right to give evi-

dence on motion by affidavit); § 229 (right to cross-examine deponent); §
230 (right to have witness attend to give evidence upon a motion).
' Hersees of Woodstock v. Goldstein [1963] 2 Ont. 81 (C.A.) is the only
reported picketing case to have reached the Ontario Court of Appeal since
1934. For an illustration of the extreme reluctance of the courts to grant leave
to appeal, see Robertson-Yates v. Fitzgerald, (1965) 50 D.L.R.2d 509 (Ont.
5

H.C.)

36 Trade Disputes Act, (1906) 6 Edw. VII, c. 47.
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most of the causes of action upon which injunctions might be
based. Whether recent developments in the English law will
lead to a resurrection of the labour injunction in the country
of its birth, remains to be seen. 17 In the United States, labour
board orders, enforceable in the courts, have displaced the
injunction as we know it.18 Indeed, since 1932 the federal courts
of the United States have been explicitly forbidden to issue
labour injunctions in all but the most extreme circumstances,
and after compliance with carefully stipulated procedural safeguards. 19 Some say that the labour board relief is too slow.
But is it necessarily beyond the ingenuity of lawyers to strike
a reasonable balance between the demands of fairness and those
of speed? Surely not. But it will not be done by slogan-mongering or academic rumination. We need a thorough statistical
analysis of present practices and their consequences. 20 Only with
this background of factual information can we lift the search
for better techniques above the parochial demands of the parties
for arrangements which will most favour their respective
positions.
Another interesting procedural problem relates to the introduction of notorious facts into the record in labour litigation.
A well-established doctrine of evidence, called "judicial notice,"
permits the judge to take account of notorious facts to supplement the evidence on the record. 21 The problem is, of course,
what facts are notorious? For example, in Smith Bros. v. Jones,
Mr. Justice McLennan took judicial notice of the fact that "the
development of the Trade Union movement has reached the
point where workers will not cross the picket line to go to
cites to the extensive
writing in English periodicals on that case. See also Wedderburn, Intimidation
and the Right to Strike, 27 MOD. L. REV. 257 (1964); Christie, Comment,
industrial Relations - Torts - intentional Interference With Advantageous
Trade Relationships, 42 CAN. B. REV. 464 (1964); Carrothers, Order Into
Chaos: The Case of The Intransigent Draughtsman, 2 U.B.C.L. REv. 270
(1965).
18 National Labour Relations Act, 29 U.S.C., Chap. 7, § 160(e); 49 Star. 449,
am. 61 Star. 136, 73 Stat. 519 § 10(e).
19Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C., Chap. 6, §§ 107 et. seq.; 47 Stat. 70,
§§ 7 et. seq.
20 For a pioneering effort in Canada, see CARROTHERS, op. cit. supra note 9;
Carrothers, The British Columbia Trade-Unions Act, 1959, 38 CAN. B. REV.
295 (1960). American studies both prior to and subsequent to Dean Carrothers' book have been invaluable in this regard; see Seidenberg, op. cit.
supra note 9, Aaron supra note 9, and FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOUR
INJUNCTION (1930).
21 Schiff, The Use of Out-of-Court Information in Fact Determination at Trial,
41 CAN. B. REv. 335 (1963).
17 Hoffman, Rookes v. Barnard, 81 L.Q. REV. 116 (1965),
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work."2 2 In Hersees of Woodstock v. Goldstein, Mr. Justice
Aylesworth was prepared
to take judicial notice that the rule [of respect for the picket line] affects
as well, many other members of the public who are not employees .. .
particularly where, as at the case at bar, there is a widespread organization of labour .... 23
Finally, in HeatherHill Appliances v. McCormick, Mr. Justice
Stewart judicially noted that
a high percentage of unions are dominated by persons from another
State whose basic concepts of law, order, good conduct and labour rela24
tions are not necessarily ours, but whose control seems to be absolute.
His judgment is replete with a variety of amusing and fanciful
similes which involve judicial notice as well: management "a
long time ago" is characterized as an "unregenerate Scrooge";25
a picket line is analogized to "an electric fence" which is said
to likewise seem "harmless enough"; 26 and unionists are characterized as "true believers" who will refuse to cross picket lines
as "a matter of faith and morals and an obligation of conscience."27 These few illustrations demonstrate that the courts
do not hesitate to supply social data where they think it necessary, by means of judicial notice, even as to such critical matters as the impact of a particular picket line upon a particular
employer. They should not necessarily be criticized for doing
so; it is worthy of serious admiration that men so remote from
industrial conflict should be so steeped in its folklore.
On the other hand, the Labour Board, which is presumably
staffed by experts in the field of industrial relations, has occasionally been chastised for engaging in a similar practice of officially noting notorious facts of industrial life. Thus, in the Tange
Company case,28 the Ontario Labour Relations Board was held to
have legally misconducted itself by reason of taking official notice
of its own earlier finding that the Christian Labour Association
discriminated on religious grounds against prospective nonChristian members, and was thus ineligible for certification.
The case is important, because it demonstrates against the ever22

Smith Bros. Construction v. Jones [1955] 4 D.L.R. 254 at 264.

23 [1963] 2 Ont. 81 at 85 (CA.).

(1965) C.C.H.L.L.. P. 14,083 (Ont. H.C.) (An appeal to the Ontario
Court of Appeal, as yet unreported, has been dismissed).
Supra note 25 at 11,364.
20 Ibid.
24

25

27 Ibid.
28
Tange Co. Ltd., (1961)

C.C.H.L.L.R. P. 16,225

(O.L.R.B.),

quashed on

cert., sub nom. R. v. O.L.R.B., ex parte Trenton Construction Workers [1963]
2 Ont. 376.
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present risk of conflict between speed and fairness. After all,
the Christian Labour Association had allegedly changed its
policies in the interval and thus could insist on being judged
on its present, not its past, practices. Its right to do so is hardly
answered by the plea that were the Board obliged to redetermine the status of a union each time it appeared in proceedings,
it surely could not function. To be sure, the Board does not
always choose speed over fairness. It often seeks full information, and invites the widest range of views, both from the parties
and from those who might be affected by the precedent impact
of decisions. An example of this is the Board's practice of
receiving submissions from local employers and unions before
defining geographic areas in construction industry certification
cases. 29 This is a sensible, praiseworthy and thoroughly nonjudicial procedure. The lawyer's task, sometimes well-performed
by the Board and sometimes not, is to devise procedures which
will allow it to employ its expertise without denying to the
parties an opportunity to make a full and effective presentation
of their position. 0
Another illustration of the need of lawyers and legal institutions to develop procedural flexibility is the issue of time
limits. The Labour Board Rules, for example, require compliance with a variety of time limits as a condition of contesting
certification of a trade union.8 ' Similarly, collective agreements
customarily specify time limits within which grievances must
be filed and processed at succeeding steps. 32 It is natural for
law-trained personnel to put great stock in time limits: after all,
court litigation is likewise riddled with them. However, proceedings before the Labour Board or arbitration boards are
frequently initiated, and often conducted throughout, by laymen; employees are key figures. Yet few laymen and even
fewer employees have any knowledge of even the rudiments of
29

3

Fraser-Brace Engineering, (1964) Mar. Mthly. Rep. 660 (O.L.R.B.); W. F.
Flynn, (1964) June Mthly. Rep. 112 (O.L.R.B.); see also An Interim Report
on Construction Industry Division Ontario Labour Relations Board, (1964)
Feb. Mthly. Rep. (O.L.R.B.).

0 See FINKELMAN, THE ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD AND NATURAL

JUSTICE, at 40 ff. (1965).
SlONT. REV. REG. 1960, Reg. 401 (as amended), §§ 6-11.
82
3 See, e.g., 1962 MASTER AGREEMENT BETWEEN MASSEY-FERGUSON

AND

U.A.W. § 606: "A grievance must be filed and appealed within the time
limits set forth above or the grievance shall be considered settled on the basis
of the last answer given." See also Webster Air Equipment Co. Grievance,

3 Lab. Arb. Cas. 1057 (1952); Kellogg Co. of Canada, 12 Lab. Arb. Cas.
22 (1961).
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the collective agreement or the Labour Relations Act, let alone a
sophisticated awareness of the risks of being out of time. Surely,
the challenge here is to develop legal rules to distinguish between those breaches of time limits which have a discernibly
disruptive effect on the conduct of proceedings, and those which
are without prejudice to anyone. It should be observed that
both the Labour Board 33 and courts3 4 are statutorily authorized
to make this distinction. Without an authorizing statute3 5 can
other industrial relations tribunals meet this challenge of flexibility and informality, when contrary modes of thought and
habits of business are deeply ingrained as a result of experience
in other kinds of proceedings?
Consider next the inhibiting effect of precedent upon the
law's response to challenges both internal and external. Lower
courts are generally bound by the past decisions of higher
courts, But, because higher courts are involved so seldom in
labour relations litigation, most of the governing authority
which controls the day-to-day disposition of cases is remote
both in time and in outlook from modern labour relations. "6 The
leading tort cases in the field, at least until recently, have been
38
the classic English trilogy, Allen v. Flood,3 7 Quinn v. Leathem,
39
and Mogul Steamship v. McGregor. These cases, decided by
the House of Lords at the turn of the century, are based upon
a suspicion of concerted labour activity. This suspicion runs
directly counter to the assumption in our modern statutes that
collective bargaining is an acceptable way of life. Moreover,
within a few years of being pronounced, the trilogy was repudiated by the enactment of the 1906 Trade Disputes Act. It is
true, of course, that the recent decisions of the House of Lords
in Rookes v. Barnard40 and Stratford v. Lindley4 ' may have
"driven a coach and four" 42 through the 1906 legislation. Yet
3

SLabour Relations Act, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 202 (1960), § 86; B.C. REV.
STAT. c. 205 (1960), § 70.
3 Rules of Practice, ONT. REV. REG. 1960, Reg. 396, §§ 178, 186.
35
1t might be argued that the Ontario Labour Relations Act, section 86, which
purports to apply to all "proceedings under this Act" extends as well to
boards of labour arbitration which have been characterized as "statutory tribunals" in Ontario: Re International Nickel & Rivando, [1956] Ont. 379
at 386 (C.A.).
.16Arthurs, supra note 7.
37 [1898] A.C. 1.
38 [1901] A.C. 495.
39 [1892] A.C. 25.
40 [1964] 1 All E.R. 367 (H.L.)
41 [1964] 3 All E.R. 102 (H.L.)
42 Christie, supra note 17.
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for fifty years or more, the English caselaw, like the English
legislation, was marked by judicial reluctance, wise or otherwise, to intervene in industrial disputes. 43 Indeed, even had the
English judges been more active, only by coincidence would
their decisions have paralleled the labour policy marked out
by our legislatures. The inevitable task of meshing common law
tort doctrines of yester-year with the latest legislation has been
undertaken with varying degrees of success by our courts.
Most defensible is a line of cases which appears to measure
the common law legality of picketing by its impact upon the
statutory scheme of industrial relations. Thus, in Smith Bros.
v. Jones44 and in Gagnon v. Foundation Maritime,45 picketing
to secure recognition was proscribed because the statute provided a peaceful and lawful procedure by which unions might
gain recognition. The certification machinery was intended to
remove recognition as a cause of industrial strife and these cases
promote the same objective. Likewise in the Therien case, 46
failure to resort to the grievance machinery to adjust a dispute
over the interpretation of a collective agreement was held to
be tortious, because it contravened the statutory policy in favour
of arbitration. Again, in the Nipissing Hotel case, 47 a union was
held liable for asserting economic pressure during negotiations,
before exhaustion of the conciliation machinery. Such pressure
was held to be wrongful because it subtracted from the union's
statutory duty to "bargain in good faith". While one may quibble,
on the facts of any of these cases, with its outcome, and with
the language in which the decision was couched, they represent
a useful attempt to integrate statutory policy into the common
law.
43

Kahn-Freund, Legal Framework, in FLANDERS & CLEGG, THE SYSTEM OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GRET BRITAIN, at 42 (1960).

44 [1955] 4 D.L.R. 254.
43 [1961] Can. Sup. Ct. 435.
46

Int'l. Bro. of Teamsters v. Therien, [1960] Can. Sup. Ct. 265.

47 Nipissing Hotel v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, (1963)

38 D.L.R.
2d 675 (Ont. H.C.).
48 Carrothers, Secondary Picketing, 40 CAN. B. REV. 57 (1962); Arthurs, Labour
Law - Secondary Picketing - Per Se Illegality - Public Policy, 41 CAN.
B. REv. 573 (1963).
49Labour Relations Act, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 202 (1960), § 57: "(1) No
person shall do any act if he knows or ought to know that, as a probable and
reasonable consequence of the act, another person or persons will engage in
an unlawful strike or an unlawful lockout. (2) Sub-section 1 does not apply
to any act done in connection with a lawful strike or lawful lockout."
50 See Laskin, The Ontario Labour Relations Amendment Act, 1960, 14 U.
TORONTO L.J. 116 (1960); also (1960), 2 ONT. LEGISL. Ass. DEB. at 21072115.
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On the other hand, there are certainly many cases in which
the courts have acted totally without reference to statutory
guidelines. This has been most dramatically demonstrated in
the law of secondary picketing.48 Here, it seems, they have
given way to the temptation to make judicial policy out of whole
cloth, rather than to merely stitch up the open seams in a wellmeasured legislative purpose. In Ontario, as in many other
provinces, the Labour Relations Act does not regulate picketing.
The only provision touching upon picketing at all is section 57
which forbids the doing of any act which as a reasonable and
49
probable consequence is likely to cause an unlawful strike.
A review of the legislative history of this provision quite clearly
indicates that it was an extremely limited incursion into the
field of picketing generally, and secondary pressures in particular.50 Indeed, it is further limited by the proviso that it has no
application to acts done during the course of a lawful strike.
Yet, notwithstanding the refusal of the Ontario legislature to"
outlaw secondary picketing, as recommended in 1958 by its
Select Committee on Labour Relations,5 1 the Ontario Court of
Appeal has done just that in the Hersees case. 52 This precedent
was followed in a recent Ontario case which forbids so-called
secondary picketing by a union, lawfully on strike, at a construction site on which several other unions were engaged. 53 While
the non-picketing unions, by tradition, respect the picket line
and thus themselves perhaps engage in an unlawful work stoppage, the saving provision of section 57 is clearly intended to
ensure that liability falls upon those who stop work unlawfully,
and not upon the picketers. But much more significant than the
failure to appreciate the rather obscure legislative policy towards picketing is the continued and flourishing development
of a body of tort doctrine totally without regard to legislative
policies. The case referred to may effectively prohibit all picketing in the construction industry since inevitably several unions
are present on a single job site.
The problem, put shortly, is that the courts have not learned
the language of contemporary industrial relations. In this day
and age to echo precedent, to talk of inducing breach of contract,
of conspiracy to injure, of nuisance, and of other choice items in
5t SELECT COMMITEE ON LABOUR RELATIONS OF THE ONTARIO LEGISLATURE,
52

at 41 (1958).

[1963] 2 Ont. 81 (C.A.).

53Robertson-Yates v. Fitzgerald,

(1965)

50 D.L.R.2d 509.

346
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the judicial "vocabulary of vituperation,"' 5 4 is to demonstrate a
total lack of understanding of the union tactics against which
these doctrines are mobilized. Of course, some of these union
tactics are objectionable; some are not. But all too often, there
is simply no investigation of their validity. If the tactic falls
into one of the traditional tort pigeon-holes, it is outlawed
without further ado. This mechanical jurisprudence, this refusal
to engage in realistic decision-making, is an almost inevitable
by-product of reliance upon precedent. Yet, after all, precedent
is the style of the common law. May it be, then, that the courts
will never be able to respond to the challenge of moulding the
common law to changed circumstances and policies, absent
clear legislative instructions?
One is little reassured by the brave words of an Ontario
judge in a recent case. 55 In granting, for the first time, an anticipatory or quia timet injunction, Mr. Justice Stewart remarked:
I have not been cited any cases in which a quia timet injunction has
been granted in labour matters nor have I been able to find any authorities myself. However, problems presented by new situations or by strange
concatenations of circumstances have never been found insuperable by the
law and, indeed, the genius of the common law has always been that
remedy should follow need and that formalism never stultify justice. Nor,
as has been said can equity be prescribed to be beyond the age of childbearing. 5 6

The other side of the argument was put eloquently by a great
American jurist, Mr. Justice Brandeis:
The unwritten law possesses capacity for growth; and has often satisfied
new demands for justice by invoking analogies or by expanding a rule
or principle. This process has been in the main wisely applied and should
not be discontinued. Where the problem is relatively simple, as it is
apt to be when private interests only are involved, it generally proves
adequate. But with the increasing complexity of society, the public interest
tends to become omnipresent; and the problems presented by new demands for justice cease to be simple. Then the creation or recognition
by courts of a new private right may work serious injury to the general
public, unless the boundaries of the right are definitely established and
wisely guarded. In order to reconcile the new private right with the
public interest, it may be necessary to prescribe limitations and rules for
its enjoyment; and also to provide administrative machinery for enforcing
the rules. It is largely for this reason that, in the effort to meet the many
new demands for justice incident to a rapidly changing civilization,
resort
57
to legislation has latterly been had with increasing frequency.

In labour matters, Brandeis' prophecy of fifty years ago has
proved sound. Today, Canadian labour tribunals exercise broad
54

Fraser v. McKernan, (1931) 40 Commw. L.R. 343 at 410 (Aust. H.C.)
(Evatt, J.).
55Foundation Co. v. McGloin, (1964) 42 D.L.R.2d 209 (Ont. H.C.).
561d. at 211.
57International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 at 262 (1918);
cf. McRuer, C.J.H.C., in Dewar v. Dwan, [1957] Ont. 546 at 548.
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remedial jurisdiction: simple and non-enforceable declarations, 58
orders of reinstatement and compensation, 59 elaborate and potent
remedies such as cease and desist ordersI0 and orders to dissolve a dominated labour organization. 61
So long as the men who administer these tribunals are competent and dedicated men, and so long as their procedures are
fair, within the limitations of fast-moving problems, there should
be no objection to this trend. However, many lawyers and laymen, well-intentioned but poorly-informed, possess an exaggerated and wholly unwarranted faith in the judges as creative
lawmakers and as the sole guardians of due process. Their
crusading zeal may yet subvert and destroy the immensely
successful administrative tribunals which have grown up over
62
the past half-century.
No less difficult than the internal adjustments of legal institutions are the challenges posed by the irresistible social forces
in the world around us, a world platitudinously described above
as undergoing a "revolution of expectations." One obvious symptom of this revolution is the increasing frequency with which
society intervenes in disputes which are said to affect the public
interest.
By any definition, disputes in public utilities, in transportation system, and in hospitals would fall within the ambit of the
public interest. In each of these fields, the public has intervened in Canada in recent years, through legislation to fore3
stall strikes by substituting a process of compulsory arbitration.
But how broadly should we define the public interest? Where
does this intervention end? The United States government
appears to have become an uninvited camel in the collective
5
VLabour
59

Relations Act, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 202 (1960), §§ 67, 68.
Labour Relations Act, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 202 (1960) § 65.
60 .abour Relations Act, B.C. REV. STAT. c. 205 (1960), § 7(4); Trade Union
Act, SASK. REV. STAT. c 259 (1953), § 5(e); Trade Union Act, N.S. REV.
1 STAT. c. 295 (1954), § 40(4).
6 Labour Relations Board Rules and Regulations, SASK. O.C. 1233/47 (as
0 2 amended), clause 5; Labour Code, QUE. REV. STAT. c. 141 (1964), § 132.
1t is noteworthy, however, that the REPORT OF THE CoMm=rrTE ON THE
ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT IN ONTARiO (1959) which recommended

"as a guiding principle that rights of appeal [from administrative tribunals]
should be facilitated wherever possible" (p. 24), also warned of the "great
harm" inherent in "prolonging the proceedings" in labour matters, and
exempted the Labour Relations Board from this recommendation (p. 25).
03 See, e.g., Railway Operations Continuation Act, CAN. STAT. c. 2 (1960);
Ontario Hydro-Employees Union Dispute Act, ONT. STAT. c. 94 (1961-62);
Toronto-Hydro Employees Union Dispute Act, ONT. STAT. c. 131 (1965);
Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act, B.C. STAT. c. 48 (1965).

U.B.C.

VOL. 2

LAW REviEw

bargaining tent of the American steel industry, gradually nudging the parties from the privacy of their conference room into
the hard cold light of public scrutiny, gradually substituting
4
for labour-management consensus a government-coerced decree.
In Toronto, the strikes several years ago of the Royal York
Hotel, and last year of the city's newspapers, were generally
viewed as community crises. In both cases the government
intervened, once sucessfully, once unsuccessfully. But it is
important to note that this intervention was informal. The legal
framework of bargaining has remained unresponsive to this
challenge, except where community consensus is overwhelming,
as in the case of public utilities, hospitals and railways. Even
here we have not responded with the imagination and flexibility
that the problem deserves. Assuming that we wish to solve such
disputes, if we can, by a process of collective bargaining, then
it is evident that any statutory solution ought to maximize the
pressures for bargaining, while safeguarding the public against
the potential harmful results of a breakdown in negotiations. 5
Instead, we have simply substituted arbitration for strikes, and
we have thereby seriously impaired the calibre of collective
bargaining. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that with
arbitration as its terminal point, bargaining, as we know it in
industry generally, will cease to exist in these special situations.
Might it not be preferable to introduce an element of uncertainty, of flexibility, into the settlement of these disputes, in order
to preserve some of the vitality of the bargaining process? For
example, the Slichter Law in Massachusetts 0 provides a choice
of procedures in situations where industrial disputes threaten
the public interest. While most of these procedures have their
counterpart in one Canadian statute or another, the full range
67
is available under a single act only in Alberta and Quebec.
64

It should be noted, however, that the most recent example of government
intervention, during the 1965 bargaining crisis, involved moral suasion rather
than legal compulsion, despite past resort to the emergency disputes provisions
of the Taft-Hartley Act.

65 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT ON COMPULSORY ARBITRATION

IN

DISPUTES

(Ontario, 1964) at 47: "The
problem then . . . is how to preserve for the sake of the hospitals, the unions
and the public, the value of free collective bargaining and at the same time
ensure that hospitals will be kept open to maintain satisfactory patient care
under conditions which will not be detrimental to either management or its
employees ... "
66 MASS. STAT. c. 150B, § 2, as am. by c. 596 L. 1947.
67 Alberta Labour Act, ALTA. REv. STAT. c. 167 (1955), § 99 (as am. ALTA.
STAT. c. 54 (1960); Labour Code, QuE. REv. STAT. c. 141 (1964), § 99
(as am. QUE. STAT. c. 50 (1965) ).
AFFECTING HOSPITALS AND THEIR EMPLOYEES
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Of course, in the sense that ad hoc legislation, rather than preestablished procedures, has been the Canadian approach, technically the government of the day has an unlimited choice of
procedures. But ad hoc legislation does have two disadvantages:
it cannot quickly be enacted, and it brands one party with a
stigma of irresponsibility which further inhibits bargaining. Of
course, one alternative to such legislation would be encourage68
ment of institutional arrangements, on the Scandinavian model,
which reduce the incidence of strikes by improving the calibre
of bargaining.
A problem of broader dimensions, but lesser intensity, is that
of technological or corporate change during the lifetime of thecollective agreement. Sometimes, an employer may make such
changes expresly in order to subvert the bargaining relationship.
Sometimes, the changes are normal responses to competitive
pressures. Has the law really proved capable of adjusting these
clashing interests - the desire for industrial relations stability
and the need for managerial flexibility in a competitive economy?
The successor rights problem affords an example. It is no secret
that some employers have engaged in a form of corporate metamorphosis for the express purpose of shedding their collective
bargaining obligations. Particularly in industries such as construction, where the goodwill attaching to a small construction
firm is negligible, might an employer conveniently go out of
business and emerge under a new corporate charter. In so doing,
under the Ontario Labour Board's jurisprudence, 9 he was able
to rid himself of the union which had organized his employees.
The Goldenberg Royal Commission, investigating labour relations in the construction industry in Ontario, recognized that
this device promoted industrial strife and had no apparent compensating benefit to the industry as a whole. 70 Accordingly, the
Commission recommended amending legislation, which ultimately
was enacted. 7' Whether or not the legislation adopted in On68
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Arthurs, Labour Lore and Labour Law: A North American View of The
DanishExperience, 12 I.C.L.Q. 247 (1963); GALENSON, THE DANISH SYSTEM
OF LABOUR RELATIONS, (1952); JOHNSTON; COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
SWEDEN, (1962).

See, e.g., New Method Laundry & Dry Cleaners,

16,059 (O.L.R.B.); Brantford Produce,

(O.LR.B.).

(1961)

(1957)

C.C.H.L.L.R. P.

C.C.H.L.L.R. P. 16,193

REPORT

OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON LABOUR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
71 IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY (Ontario, 1962) at 44 ff.
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Tbe Legislation recommended by the Commission was enacted by Labour
Relations Act. ONT. STAT. c. 68 (1961-62), § 4 (never proclaimed in force);
replaced by ONT. STAT. c. 70 (1962-63), now § 47a.
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tario, and other Canadian jurisdictions,7 2 is really adequate to
the task at hand, is a matter of serious controversy.7 3 It is noteworthy, however, that the National Labour Relations Board in
the United States - unlike our own labour boards - solved the
74
same problems without legislative assistance.
The related problem of sub-contracting has also been met
with a singular lack of imagination and intellectual sophistication by Canadian arbitrators. Again without regard to a contrary
American jurisprudence of substantial dimensions, 75 the trend of
the Canadian law has been to permit sub-contracting wherever
the work is no longer to be done under the employer's supervision and direction. Adopting a highly irrelevant test of employment from the law of agency, and prostrating themselves
before the doctrine of management rights, Canadian arbitrators
have failed to appreciate the potential risks of sub-contracting
to industrial peace. Similarly, the "runaway plant" problem has
evoked a minimal response from our legislators and labour
boards.7 7 The issue is by no means clear, but surely a balance
must be struck at some point between an employer's absolute
freedom, and the interests of his workers and their union. Where
the movement of work is the product of economic pressures, for
example, a desire to be nearer markets, suppliers, or transportation, labour relations policies are no more than a neutral factor
in evaluating it. It is rather humanitarian concern for employees
displaced or left behind which may prompt public intervention.
However, where dislocation or plant removal is motivated by
anti-union sentiment, our public policy of promoting collective
bargaining has been thwarted.7 9 The runaway plant, or the plant
that has displaced its workers to escape unions, is certainly
,2See, e.g., Labour Relations Act, § 19, MAN. REV.

STAT. c. 132 (1954), §§
10(1) (d), 18(1) (c) (as amended); Labour Relations Act, B.C. REV. STAT.
c. 205 (1960), § 12A (as amended).
SHamilton Cotton, (1964) June Mthly. Rep. 190 (O.L.R.B.); Dutch Boy
Food Markets, (1965) C.C.H.LL.R. P. 16,051 (O.L.R.B.); Thorco Manufacturing Limited, (1965) C.C.H.L.L.R. P. 16,052 (O.L.R.B.); National Paper
Box, (1964) C.C.H.L.L.R. P. 14,002 (B.C.S.C.); Gulf Island Navigation Ltd.
v. Seafarers International et al., (1959) 18 D.L.R.2d 216 (B.C.S.C.).
74 Wiley v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
75 See Fibreboard Paper Products v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203 (1964); Anderson,
Plant Removals and Subcontracting of Work, 15 LAB. LAw Jo. 608 (1964).
',For a comparison of U.S. and Canadian Developments, see generally YOUNG,
THE CONTRACTING OUT OF WORK (1964).
77Amalgamated Electric Corp., (1963) Oct. Mthly. Rep. 403 (O.L.RB.).
78Plant Relocation and Its Consequences, 65 LAB. GAZ. 702 (1965).
79Alger Press Ltd., (1964) Sept. Mthly. Rep. 290 (O.L.R.B.); but see R. v.
Labour Relations Board (B.C.), ex parte White Lunch, (1963) 42 D.L.R.2d
364 (B.C.S.C.).
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falling below a community standard of conduct as surely as the
plant which pollutes a nearby river, or produces a nuisance in
a residential neighbourhood. Although control may be difficult,
given a "rule of reason" it should not be impossible to ensure
compliance with community standards.80
Allied to the problem of allocating work as between those
in the bargaining unit and those beyond it, is the problem of
allocating work as between men and machines. 81 A collective
bargaining contract constructs an edifice of classifications and
wages upon a foundation of stable and familiar techniques of
production. Particularly in mature and sophisticated collective
bargaining relationships do the parties evaluate carefully the
labour content of jobs, to ensure that remuneration will correspond to effort and skill. Moreover, the seniority clause does not
merely protect the older worker for humanitarian reasons; it
assumes as well that the senior employee will be more highly
skilled and thus better qualified to fill highly paid jobs. This
latter assumption is also based upon the continued existence of
familiar production patterns. Finally, the very premise of collective bargaining itself assumes a stable rather than a dynamic
need for labour; it is the predicted availability of work, or the
anticipated effect of a threatened withdrawal of services that
ultimately pressures the parties to bring about an agreement
during their negotiations. Technological change may shatter this
foundation of assumptions and topple the entire legal edifice.
Consider the impact of technological change on the wage and
classification structure. The agreement identifies by name a
number of jobs. If their content is radically transformed, or their
very existence ceases, what wages and classifications are then
to apply to the former occupants of those jobs? To foresee all
new classifications which might conceivably come into existence
during the lifetime of the agreement is an obvious exercise in
futility. To forbid the introduction of new machines (and thus
of new job classifications) is to place an impossibly high premium
on stability, with almost disastrous consequences for the employer's competitive position. Yet to allow the employer freedom
to break down old work patterns, is not to say that he must be
allowed freedom to erect new ones. If the employer could simply
80

Fibreboard Paper Products v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203 (1964); Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing, 85 S. Ct. 994 (1965).

81 See

generally SOMERS, CUSHMAN, WEINBERG (eds.), ADJUSTING To TECH-

NOLOGICAL CHANGE

(1963).
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establish new classifications, he might destroy the fruits of collective bargaining by his unilateral act. By and large, neither
the parties nor the law have responded in an imaginative fashion
to the challenge of reconciling the employer's freedom to innovate with the regime of collective bargaining. Unions have asked
for the right to strike to force the employer to bargain about,
and agree upon, new classifications and wages, a right now suspended during the lifetime of a collective agreement.8 2 Employers,
on the other hand, are content with the status quo, because the
statutory obligation to arbitrate disputes during the period when
strikes are forbidden only extends to the interpretation or application of the agreement, and not to the fixing of new wages and
working conditions.8 3 A compromise, one which has appeal as a
reasonable use of a legal mechanism, is to entrust the fixing of
new work standards and wages to third party adjudication. This
is not to say that such adjudication must in every case take
place. Rather, the possibility of arbitration provides an incentive
for the parties to resolve their differences by negotiation. There
is no inconsistency in stating that arbitration of wage disputes
in public services impedes collective bargaining, while it has the
opposite effect in disputes involving the reclassification of employees after technological change. In public service disputes
there are potentially large gains to be had in arbitration which
cannot be won in negotiation, so that one of the parties would
rather arbitrate than negotiate; contrariwise, in classification
disputes, the new wage rates an arbitrator will likely fix, which
may often affect only a few employees, will be only marginally
different from the former rates, so that there is an incentive to
avoid the time and expense of arbitration.8 4 On this proposal, a
double caveat: who will arbitrate and how? Few arbitrators are
skilled in job evaluation. Most people with experience and expertise in this field are employed by either unions or management, and are consequently unable to act as neutral arbitrators.
The parties and the government have a joint responsibility to
begin a programme of recruitment in this highly sensitive, and
obviously expanding, area of labour arbitration. As important
82

Labour Relations Act, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 202 (1960), §§ 33, 54; BC. REV.
STAT. c. 205 (1960), § 46.
Labour Relations Act, ONT. REv. STAT. c. 202 (1960), § 34; B.C. REv. STAT.
c. 205 (1960), § 22.
84 This suggestion is corroborated by experience in the garment industry, where
collective agreements typically call for arbitration of "prices" (piece-work
rates), failing agreement. Arbitration is seldom, if ever, resorted to.
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as the question of personnel is the question of technique. Fixing
new wages and work standards is both a more creative and a
more technical task than adjudication of contract interpretation
disputes. Perhaps the familiar adversary approach to arbitration is inappropriate: the arbitrator, after all, might wish to make
his own time and motion studies, and should not be confined to
choosing between one of two contradictory results put in evidence
by the parties.
However, while arbitration and various consultative devices
are extremely useful in reducing the short-run tensions of disruption and displacement through technological change, in the
long run the answers will not likely be found either in collective
bargaining legislation or indeed in the collective bargaining process. The problem has its genesis in the employment relationship,
but is part of a larger social concern. The victims of technological
displacement, particularly older workers who cannot adapt to
new industrial techniques, represent in two senses a failure of
society. In the first place, they reflect a failure of our educational
system: we simply have not trained people to be adaptable.
Second, they demonstrate a failure of our social security system:
we are not yet able to cope with the appearance on the labour
market of that largely unmarketable commodity, the unskilled
worker. We have not really learned to avoid human spoilage and
waste. Responsibility in this area thus lies beyond the narrow
labour-management community. The burdens of training and
retraining, of job-finding and job-making, cannot be borne by a
particular company and union whose resources and horizons are
necessarily limited.
The most fundamental impact of technological change has
been upon the balance of power at the bargaining table. The
brutal, but inescapable, reality of the computer-age strike is that
the employer no longer needs to hire striking union members,
or even unemployed nonunionists. Now the computer crosses the
picket line and "scabs" in the struck plant. This is the lesson of
the Toronto newspaper strike and of several refinery strikes.
Deprived of their traditional technique of mounting economic
pressures - the strike - it can fairly be expected that unions
will experiment with other tactics. Some of these - physical
violence to persons or property - are so obviously anti-social
that they cannot be permitted. The law's response to such violence is predictable (and usually effective) because there is
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wide agreement on the social undesirability of such conduct. A
much more acceptable tactic, one much closer to the mainstream
of industrial combat, has been the exertion of various forms of
secondary economic pressure. Attempts have been made to secure
customer boycotts, to persuade suppliers and commercial carriers to sever business relations with the struck employer, and
to encourage non-striking employees in allied jobs to cease work.
All have some arguable validity in a situation where the mere
withdrawal of labour, the standard bargaining tactic, has virtually no impact. Yet in each attempt, the strikers have been
confronted with legal obstacles, some legislative, 85 others judgemade."" While the law has been inept in resolving the underlying dispute, it has certainly helped to determine the outcome of
the strike by preventing various forms of economic pressure.
On the one hand, it is possible to simply shrug and say that those
who strike against the computer are in the same position as
any weak union, and had best accept the realities of that position.
On the other hand, this counsel of despair is an admission of
the willingness to contemplate the ultimate breakdown of collective bargaining, as we know it, in many areas of industry. However, the law could be changed to permit the union to launch
countervailing pressures which would to some extent offset the
advantages of the computer. In other words we might shift the
contest from the labour market, where it is no longer meaningful, to the consumer market where the parties are more evenly
matched, by making legal certain forms of secondary pressure
which are not now permitted. Because such a legal development
is unlikely, unions will probably seek instead to redress the
balance of power by altering their structure so as to embrace
a wider range of employees, not all of whom would be pitted
against the computer in competition for work. Thus, in the newspaper industry, an industry-wide union, whose members gather
news as well as print it, would not have been subject to the same
pressures as the much more narrowly-based craft union. Yet
even if the balance of power is restored, the underlying problem
will remain unresolved: who will bear the cost of human
obsolescence?
85 Secondary picketing is proscribed in British Columbia: Trade-Unions Act, B.C.
REv. STAT. c. 384 (1960), § 3; and in Newfoundland: Labour Relations Act,
NFLD. REV. STAT. c. 258 (1952), (as amended), § 43A.
86 See Carrothers and Arthurs, supra note 48: Heather Hill Appliances v. McCormick, (1965) C.C.H.L.L.R. P. 14,083 (Ont. H.C.).
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The prospect of change in union structure poses another
critical question. Is it possible - or desirable - to reshape the
labour movement by compulsion of law to meet the revolutions
of our times? By way of example, consider once again our
revolution of expectations. More and more we are coming to
expect of our union movement a level of responsibility, integrity, democracy, and social consciousness, which would make
it an institutional refutation of the doctrine of original sin.
Can the law guarantee our expectations? Obviously, legislation
can do much to stop overt forms of undesirable behaviour. The
Landrum-Griffin Act in the United States,8 7 with its Bill of
Rights for Union Members, makes legally enforceable the right
to democracy and honesty in union administration. In response
to a generally less urgent situation, 8 a number of scattered
provisions have appeared in Canadian labour legislation which
seek the same end. 89 Overt forms of racial and religious discrimination, recently forbidden in the United States, have for
many years been outlawed in Canada.9°
It is important not merely to state the undeniable fact that
law may have some influence, but also to analyse more precisely
exactly what that influence is. Obviously, law acts as a deterrent.
Yet equally important is the educative role of law; by a public
declaration of the standards of conduct which we expect, many
will be led into voluntary, indeed willing, compliance. As a
sage has remarked, "many a man has become a good man as a
result of a life of hypocrisy." Thus, by continually doing what
is expected of us, even without a deep belief in the conventional
morality, we may gradually come to believe in its validity.9 '
On the other hand, even the most vigorous programme of enforcement cannot overcome widespread public indifference or
hostility to the law's objectives. The prohibition era proved this.
Thus, it is important that any law directed towards shaping the
87

Labour-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519.
The major exception to this generality, the Seafarers International Union, is
89 discussed infra.
See, e.g., Ontario Labour Relations Act, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 202 (1960),
§§ 60-63; British Columbia Labour Relations Act, B.C. REv. STAT. c. 205
(1960) §§ 66, 66A; Alberta Labour Act, §§ 105-107A; Newfoundland Trade
Union Act, NFLD. STAT. c. 59 (1960). Except for the Newfoundland statute,
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90 statements.
See, e.g., Ontario Human Rights Code, ONT. STAT. c. 93 (1961-62), § 4
(originally Fair Employment Practices Act, ONT. STAT. c. 24 (1951)).
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Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1401 at 1439
(1958).
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destiny of the labour movement be enacted with the assistance
and participation of those most directly concerned. The vast
majority of Canadian labour leaders are firmly committed to
democracy and honesty, and they ought to be invited to help
make laws which would apply to the tiny minority that are not.
Because there is a natural and justifiable fear that those outside the house of labour do not always possess a sympathetic
understanding of its tenants, so far as possible the enforcement
of such laws should also be an internal matter. The Public
Review Board of the United Automobile Workers is an excellent
model of non-governmental, union-created machinery which can
and should be utilized in any systematic approach to regulating
2
the internal affairs of labour unions.
But when we turn from the more obvious dangers of "bossism"
to the much subtler questions of union structure and organization, law may well be too crude an instrument to accomplish
our purposes. Parliament imposed trusteeship upon the S.I.U.
and the other maritime unions 3 While the trusteeship has not
yet ushered in the millenium in organizational purity, it has
curbed the worst abuses of power. Yet, the Trustees have been
totally unable to execute their task of welding the various maritime unions into a single effective organization. 4 Moreover, even
in the internal reform of the S.I.U., the Trustees have been compelled to acknowledge institutional realities and loyalties, which
have produced the reelection to office of most of the officials of
the former regime. Government is obviously not powerless to
control one of the most important private institutions in our
society, but it can do so most effectively if it operates by example
and exhortation, rather than by command. Austin's sovereign
did not reign over a pluralistic society. Consider, for example,
how government might encourage a more highly centralized
labour movement. By government invitation, various central
labour bodies could be given an important role in economic forecasting, legislative revision, and consultation in policy planning,
which would greatly enhance their importance vis-a-vis their
92 Stieber, Oberer & Harrington, "Report to the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions," DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC REVIEW (1960), at 64: "If
review were to spread to other unions, it would not create a dynamic labour
democracy out of thin air, but it would be an institutional reform of real
significance for the ideal of a free society."
93 Maritime Transportation Unions Trustees Act, CAN. STAT. c. 17 (1963).
94
REPORT OF INDUSTRIAL INQUIRY COMMISSION ON THE DISRUPTION
SHIPPING (Hon. T. G. Norris, Commissioner) at 305 (1963).
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affiliates. 95 Industry-wide bargaining likewise emphasizes the
authority of central labour bodies. Therefore, when government
itself bargains, it clearly ought to insist on centrally organized,
rather than autonomous, union negotiators on the other side of
the table. 6 And when collective bargaining takes place in the
normal way between employers and unions, government leadership can give great impetus to industry-wide negotiations. That
the attempt in the Ontario construction industry, following the
Goldenberg Commission Report, to conduct such negotiations
under government auspices was unsuccessful, should not foreclose the experiment for all time. 7 However, a law which compels the dissolution or merger of unions, 8 which compels their
affiliation or non-afmiation with national or international groups, 99
is an unwarranted interference with a basic civil liberty - freedom of association - which would not seem to be justified by
any labour relations crisis in the recent past or present. One
could similarly stigmatize the 1961 British Columbia legislation
outlawing political activity by labour unions. 10 0 Quite apart from
any questions as to constitutionality, 101 the legislation represents
a failure to come to grips with the basic issues in union political
activity. To explain the prohibition of such activity as protection of the right of union members to refrain from coerced political activity 0 2 is cynical: any one of a number of lesser restraints
could have secured this important goal. To explain the prohibition as an attempt to confine unions to their "proper" function
as collective bargaining agents'0 3 is question-begging: unions
have been engaged in both legislative lobbying and direct political action almost since their inception. 0 4 Surely it would have
0905 Arthurs, supra note 68 at 250 ff.
For example, in the recent strike of postal employees, no single, national
organization spoke for the strikers.
97 An account of the conference is contained in WINKLER, A STUDY OF LABOUR
RELATIONS LAW IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY IN ONTARIO (1964,
Unpublished LL.M. Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School).
98 Trade Union (Emergency Provisions) Act, NFLD. STAT. c. 2 (1959).
99 See Forsey, The Prince Edward Island Trade Union Act, 1948, 26 CAN. B.
REv. 1159 (1948).
100 B.C. STAT. c. 31 (1961), § 5 (now Labour Relations Act, B.C. REv. STAT.
c. 205 (1960), § 9(6).
101 All such questions were decided favourably to the legislation in Oil, Chemical
& Atomic Workers v. Imperial Oil, [1963] Can. Sup. Ct. 584. But see Comments, 22 U. OF TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 161 (1964); 3 O.H.LJ. 203 (1964).
102 Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers v. Imperial Oil, supra note 101 at 593,
596 (Martland, J.).
103 Id. at 608 (Ritchie, J.).
104 As early as 1874, a member of the Ontario legislature was elected as a "Workingmen's Candidate." See FRENcH, FArT,
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been possible to protect the dissentient union member by allowing those who favour political action to "opt in" by specifically
authorizing the deduction of political contributions. As well, the
legislation might have forbidden discrimination in administration
of the collective agreement or in enjoyment of union membership on the grounds of political neutrality or non-neutrality. If
the statute was simply a response to the plight of the dissentient
employee, it was an inappropriate response: the legislature
wielded a sabre instead of a scalpel.
A recurring theme in this long and discordant fugue of challenge and response is the need for effective techniques of lawmaking. By what process can legal institutions and rules be
made to respond more quickly and effectively to the challenges
of industrial relations? This is a crucial question, for it is the
way in which law is made, as much as its content, that determines its effectiveness.
One need not apologize for seeking the answer in the experience of Scandinavia, an experience that has been characterized
by a high degree of success, by a deep commitment to democracy,
and by frequent experimentation to meet the changing demands
of the industrial environment. The key to law-making in Scandinavia is the full and active participation of labour and management. 10 5 Characteristically, legislation there is passed at the
joint request of labour and management, to implement policies
agreed upon between them. An active role in the administration
of legislation is assigned to the central labour and management
federations. 10 6 Often, indeed, their consensus makes legislation
unnecessary, and they live under a form of private self-government. 10 7 What we should import from Scandinavia is not the
detail of its system, but this central, sensible concept of labour
and management participation in the process of law-making. To
secure this participation we should establish a labour law commission, a sort of industrial parliament, in which would be
gathered unionists and businessmen, lawmakers and academics.
Its concern would be an ongoing examination of existing poli105 See generally Arthurs, supra note 68; GALENSON, JOHNSTON, op. cit. supra

note 68.
106 For example, only the central federations have a right of audience before the
Danish labour court.
107The substantive legal framework of industrial relations (comparable to our
Labour Relations Act) in both Denmark and Sweden ;s a "Basic Agreement,"
entered into in 1899 and 1938, respectively, between the central labour and
management federations of each country.
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cies, a reasoned exploration of new proposals, and outspoken
support for legislation and institutions which intelligent men
of good faith could accept as the reasonable compromise between
divergent interests. The term "parliament," of course, has a
double connotation. The French word "parlement" originally
described a chamber of discussion. (Indeed, some would say
that this description is equally apt today.) This labour law
commission has an important function as a chamber of discussion. At the moment, there is no neutral ground upon which
labour, management, public officials, and the academic community, can meet regularly. There are few occasions, beyond
the crises produced by collective bargaining, or controversial
legislative proposals, for the exchange of views. Thus, there is
no accumulation of a fund of goodwill that stems from familiarity and respect, upon which the parties may draw in difficult
times. There is much to be said, therefore, for a chamber of
discussion. But "parliament" in our contemporary sense is primarily a legislative body. In a special way, this industrial parliament should legislate, as well. Naturally, it must not usurp
the functions of the duly elected legislators. However, a measure which had been carefully examined, and approved, by
such a representative body would likely muster the necessary
parliamentary majority without difficulty. Once enacted, moreover, laws would more effectively command the obedience of
all concerned, because of the pre-commitment to legislative
policy by well-known unionists, business leaders, and disinterested critics. Another important function of the industrial parliament would be to give the kind of expert and detailed attention to legislation which is so difficult to obtain within the
machinery of government. For this purpose, the industrial parliament should be supported by a "civil service" of economists,
lawyers, sociologists, industrial management consultants, and
labour staff members, recruited and mobilised under the auspices
of the universities.
Finally, and perhaps in the far distant future, one can envisage voluntary adherence by labour and management to the
standards of behaviour enunciated by the industrial parliament.
In securing this voluntary adherence, the pre-eminence of the
representative members would be of obvious importance.
No doubt this system of law-making will appear to many to
be hopelessly visionary. It is premised on the existence of repre-
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sentatives who can speak with some authority for the parties
a premise very much at odds with our present anarchy of
autonomous union and management decision-makers. But to
return to an earlier analogy, economic and military coalitions
and supra-national authorities are breaking down long-cherished
traditions of nationalism. Today's problems are to swift-moving,
today's solutions too complex, today's failures too costly, for
countries to spurn the international forum provided by the
United Nations. The same considerations may produce effective
participation in an industrial parliament.
But whatever may come of this proposal, the hope for more
effective responses to the challenges of industrial relations lies
largely in the creativity of lawyers. As Professor Archibald
Cox'0 8 so eloquently remarked in a speech entitled "Lawyers
and Social Ferment":
Even in a time of ferment and necessary social change - especially in
such a time - the most important thing about the legal profession is
that we inherit the tradition of seven or eight centuries of continuous
concern for the institutions and aspirations for the processes, ideals
and sense of right and justice - that make for free and civilized society
....
Our own era has urgent need for lawyers not to resist change but
to channel the vital forces at work in the community along the lines of
justice and reason, on a scale and at a pace heretofore unprecedented.
Only thus can we fulfill our ancient heritage. . .109

A lawyer, a member of a profession centuries old, who is
also a student of industrial relations, a discipline whose existence can hardly be measured in decades, can ask for no more
than a vital interaction between the law and the industrial relations community. Each must work its magic upon the other so
that the older discipline will be rejuvenated, and the younger
brought to maturity.

los Sometime Solicitor-General of the United States, now Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
109 Address to Hastings College of Law, University of California, reprinted in
(1965) HARVARD LAW SCHOOL BULLETIN 6.

